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PAST DUE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
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F money is borrowed on credit and not repaid, then creditors come
knocking. This is not a foreign proposition, and almost everyone has
had some experience with it, either directly or indirectly. People and
companies are not the only ones that feel the creditor's pinch when funds
become scarce; countries can also default on their debt obligations.' Ar-
gentina is no stranger to this fact, and has defaulted seven times over the
past 200 years.2 Further, Argentina's 2001 default was "the largest sover-
eign default ever at the time." 3
The impacts of such an occurrence are not short-lived, and it appears
that Argentina defaulted for an eighth time this July when it "missed a
coupon payment on its restructured sovereign bonds." '4 Argentina hotly
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1. While sovereign debt defaults do occur, they are not are not overly frequent and
only forty occurred between 1970 and 2010. John A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the
Problem of Vulture Holdout: International Certification Boards for Sovereign-Debt
Restructurings, 49 TEx. INr'i L.J. 221, 223 (2014). Moreover, there are different
standards for what constitutes a sovereign default. "According to Moody's, a sov-
ereign default occurs whenever a country defaults on any of its bonds." Joy Dey,
Collective Action Clauses Sovereign Bondholders Cornered?, 15 L. & Bus. Rv.
AM. 485, 493 (2009). "Standard & Poor's (S&P) defines default as the failure of a
borrower to meet principal or interest payment of its debt obligations on the due
date." Id.
2. Shane Roming, Argentina's Long History of Economic Booms and Busts, WA..L
ST. J. MONIYBEAT (July 30, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/
07/30/argentinas-long-history-of-economic-booms-and-busts/.
3. Id.
4. Hugh Bronstein, Default? What Default? Argentina slams U.S. for using 'D' Word,
Rr:UrERS (Sep. 16 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/16/us-ar-
gentina-debt-idUSKBNOHB2B520140916.
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contests that any default took place, and instead argues that it attempted
to make the payment, but could not because of rulings by U.S. courts in
ongoing proceedings between it and holdout creditors from the 2001 de-
fault.5 In response, Argentina recently passed legislation that allows it to
bypass U.S. judicial decisions and repay holders of restructured sovereign
debt without conceding to holdout creditors.
6
The ongoing developments between Argentina, its creditors (both
those that agreed to restructured debt exchanges and those that held
out), and the United States will have far reaching implications.7 In Ar-
gentina, the immediate effect of another default could cripple the nation's
ability to obtain credit. 8 On a grander scale, the precedent set in this
dispute could determine the course taken in the Eurozone's resolution of
Greece's 2012 default, the largest in history, and, in effect, shape the fu-
ture of sovereign debt defaults and restructurings.9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
When considering sovereign defaults, it is important to keep in mind
some key differences between the credit defaults of people and those of
corporations. The most apparent difference is the vastly grander scope of
a sovereign default than a personal or corporate default) 0 The impact of
a sovereign default affects not only that nation, but, given the intercon-
nectedness of global economies, countries and people the world over.1
A less obvious, but arguably more important divergence between the two
lies in the fact that sovereign debt defaults are not governed by a single,
universally applicable and statutorily recorded bankruptcy code. 12 In-
stead of filing for bankruptcy, sovereign states "restructure their debt to
prevent or resolve financial and economic crises and to achieve debt sus-
tainability levels."' 3
This approach presents a number of challenges, chiefly holdout credi-
5. Id.
6. Julie Deisher, Argentina passes law circumventing US Court ruling limiting debt
repayments, JuiusTi (Sept. 12, 2014, 8:44 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/09/
argentina-passes-law-circumventing-us-court-ruling-limiting-debt-repayments.php.
7. Daniel Huang, Don't Cry for Them: The World's Biggest Sovereign Defaults Since





10. Dey, supra note 1, at 493.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 495.
13. In layman's terms, this typically involves a sovereign's creditors agreeing to new
repayment terms as part of an effort to allow the sovereign to pay off its debts (or
at least a mutually agreed upon portion of them) while mitigating the negative
effect on its economy. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu
Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: A Complex Quest, 43 INT'j LAW. 1217, 1218
(2009).
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tors.1 4 In some cases, sovereign debt issues include a Collective Action
Clause (CAC) that sets out "what percentage of a bond issue would have
to agree to a restructuring for it to be possible to force that restructuring
on the" rest of the bondholders, whether they agreed to it or not.15 When
debt issues do not include CACs, small groups of holdout creditors can
delay or even prevent restructuring efforts. 16 Among holdout creditors,
there exists a more contentious subset: vulture funds. Vulture funds buy
sovereign debt at discounted rates from the original debt holder and then
demand repayment at full value while refusing efforts at restructuring. 17
While vulture funds are legal and make good business sense, the ap-
proach strikes many as morally reprehensible, especially those associated
with the nation in default. 18 Nevertheless, they are a part of the reality
that a country must face when it defaults on its debt obligations. 19
Argentina provides a prime example of just how confounding the pros-
pect of default can be for a sovereign nation. In 1991, Argentina adopted
an economic program called the "Covertabilidad" that linked the value of
the Argentinean peso to the U.S. dollar as part of an effort to reduce debt
and manage inflation.20 While the Convertabilidad was initially effective,
it also made the Argentinian "economy vulnerable to foreign crisis." 21
The public was acutely aware of this fact and, in 2001, fear of a devalua-
tion led to a bank run that caused Argentina's financial system to spiral
out of control. Ultimately, Argentina defaulted on over one-hundred bil-
lion U.S. dollars in external bond debt to its domestic and foreign
creditors. 22
In an effort to address "the $102 billion debt that the country main-
tained with its domestic and foreign creditors, the government opened
two debt exchanges in 2005 and 2010, through which it managed to get
14. There are three basic parties involved in a sovereign debt restructuring: the sover-
eign, holders of original bonds, and holders of restructured bonds. The sovereign
is the debtor on both types of bonds. "The old bonds are those held by the hold-
outs that did not participate in the exchange offer." Id. "The new bonds are those
that were issues to creditors as result of the exchange offer, i.e. as result of the
tender of their old bonds for new bonds." Id. Generally, holdouts (even when
they are small in number or proportion) can hold up an entire restructuring agree-
ment if they do not agree with it unless there is a collective action clause (CAC).
Id. at 486.
15. Tim Wortsall, Argentina's Default, Vulture Funds, And The Little Secret That Not









20. Joanna Som6es, Sovereign Bond Disputes Before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from
the Argentina Crisis, 17 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 683 (2011).
21. Id.
22. During the bank run, "approximately one billion dollars were withdrawn daily."
Id. Although the Argentinian government placed heavy restrictions on the with-
drawal and transfer of funds, such measures were ineffective. Id.
2015]
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support from 93 percent of the investors by providing them with a settle-
ment at a 65 percent discount on the dollar. '23 The remaining 7 percent,
however, consists of vulture funds that refused the restructuring offer. 24
These holdouts, led by U.S. hedge fund NML Capital, embody the vul-
ture fund mantra and bought Argentinian debt when it "was on the verge
of default at a discounted price," then sued Argentina in the Southern
District of New York "for the full amount owed on the debt, plus inter-
est," when it failed to make payments. 25 Almost unbelievably, it is Ar-
gentina's conflict with this small remainder of its sovereign debt holders
that has the world on edge.
III. DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS
A. OVERVIEW OF ARGENTINA'S CONFLICT WITH NML CAPITAL
AND OTHER VULTURE FUNDS
Argentina's conflict with NML Capital is not a one-off case, but a
string of disputes-collectively referred to here as the NML v. Argentina
saga-centered on efforts at debt collection stretching across multiple
years.26 As stated above, "[t]he NML plaintiffs [collectively, NML], are a
coalition of distressed debt funds and retail investors who sat out the re-
structuring, sued, and then launched a largely fruitless global search for
Argentine assets."'27 Although the initial cases between NML and Ar-
gentina began over a decade ago, discussion for the purposes of this anal-
ysis begins much more recently with a case decided in 2012 that set the
social, political, and legal stage for how the NML v. Argentina saga will
play out.
In NML I, in addition to seeking money judgments that it worried
would be uncollectable, NML also "held some Argentine bonds in re-
serve and returned to federal court in New York to demand specific per-
formance of the underlying bond covenants. '2 8 NML's stance is based
23. Argentina's Debt Battle: Why the 'Vulture Funds' Are Circling, Knowledge@Whar-
ton, WHARTON SCii. U. PA. (July 3, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/argentinas-debt-battle-vulture-funds-circling/; see also Rodrigo Olivares-
Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu Or Not To Pari Passu: That Is The Question In
Sovereign Bonds After The Latest Episode Of The Argentina Saga, 15 L. & Bus.
Ri.v. AM. 745, 747 - 49 (2009); see also NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina
(NML 1), 699 F.3d 246, 251 -54 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. denied. 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013).
24. Alexcia Chambers, Moment: Implications of Argentina's Default, DI'LOMATIC
COURIER (Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.diplomaticourier.com/blog/2362-moment-im-
plications-of-argen tina-s-default.
25. Id.; see also The Economist Explains: Why Argentina may default on its debts,
ECONOMIST (July 29, 2014, 11:50 PM), http://economist.comlblogsleconomist-ex-
plains/2014/07/economist-explains-22 (explaining that NML Capital, along with the
other vulture funds, "scooped up cheap defaulted debt in order to chase payment
of full principal plus interest in the New York courts, under whose law the original
bonds were written.").
26. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litiga-
tion, 31 YALE J. ON REGo. 189, 190 - 91 (2014).




upon a quirky boilerplate provision called a pari passu clause. 29 The pari
passu clause in Argentina's bonds stated that Argentina would "'rank at
least equally' with all its other indebtedness," which, at its core, means
that if a debtor cannot pay all of its creditors then it must pay them
equally as opposed to paying some and not others. 30 Conversely, Argen-
tina argued that the injunctive relief sought would violate the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides that "the property in
the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment
arrest and execution. '31 Judge Griesa of the Southern District of New
York was not persuaded by Argentina's argument and issued an injunc-
tion in 2012, whereby "Argentina may no longer pay the holders of its
restructured bonds ... unless it pays NML in full, an amount now esti-
mated at around $1.4 billion." 32 The Second Circuit affirmed Judge
Griesa's ruling based on the rationale that Argentina breached a contrac-
tual duty "when it prioritized paying holders of its restructured debt over
the bondholders who held its defaulted debt."' 33 In other words, "when-
ever Argentina pays on the bonds or other obligations that it issued in
2005 or 2010 exchange..., the Republic must also make a 'ratable pay-
ment' to plaintiffs who hold defaulted bonds." '34
To be sure, NML I and NML H seem like cut and dry cases: Argentina
owes the holders of its sovereign debt and should treat each of them
equally. 35 Argentina, however, views the outcomes in a different light.
As an initial matter, there is some debate whether pari passu clauses are
29. NML 1, 699 F.3d at 263 - 64.
30. Id.; Felix Salmon, Hedge Fund vs. Sovereign: How U.S. Courts Are Radically Up-
ending International Finance, FoREI- N Ari-. (June 24, 2014), http://www.foreignaf-
fairs.com/articles/141588/felix-salmon/hedge-fund-vs-sovereign.
31. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2014). While the FSIA di-
rectly addresses judicial "seizure and control over specific property ... courts are
also barred from granting 'by injunction, relief which they may not provide by
attachment."' NML 1, 699 F.3d at 262, quoting S & S Machinery Co. v
Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1983).
32. Basically, "the injunction allows Argentina to keep stiffing NML, but only if it also
stiffs the exchange bondholders." Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 26 at 191; see
also NML 1, 699 F.3d at 262 - 65 (explaining that the injunctions sought are not
barred by FSIA because "[t]hey affect Argentina's property only incidentally to
the extent that the order prohibits Argentina from transferring money to some
bondholders and not others), NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic (NML II), No. 08 Civ.
6978 (TPG), 2012 WL 5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), affd, 2013 WL 4487563
(2d. Cir. 23, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
33. Max Slater, Federal appeals court orders Argentina to pay more than $1 billion to
investors, JuRsr (Oct. 27, 2012, 11:11 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/10/
federal-appeals-court-orders-argentina-to-pay-more-than-I -billion-to-inves-
tors.php; See also NML 1, 699 F.3d at 264 - 65 (2nd Cr. 2012).
34. John R. Crock, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, Second Circuit Affirms Orders Requiring Argentina to Treat Restructured and
Holdout Bond Holders Equally; Argentina Seeks Certiorari in Related Extraterrito-
rial Discovery Case, 107 AM. J. INT'' L., 930, 930 - 31 (2013). In NML II, the court
clarified that the ratable payment requirements means "that whenever Argentina
pays a percentage of what is due on the Exchange Bonds, it must pay plaintiffs the
same percentage of what is then due on the FAA bonds." Id. at 931; see also NML
I, 2012 WL 5895786 at *2.
35. See generally NML 1, 699 F.3d 246 (2nd Cr. 2012); NML II, 2012 WL 5895786.
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at all binding during sovereign default proceedings. 36 Argentina, framing
the issue within that context, views NML I and NML II as judicial mal-
practice and a "counterintuitive interpretation of a boilerplate provision
[that] upsets settled financial market expectations and threatens all future
sovereign debt restructurings. ' '37 In addition, Argentina already made ef-
forts to treat all of its creditors equally "[i]n September 2013, [when] it
suspended indefinitely its Lock Law (which was designed to ensure that
holdouts would not be treated better than exchange bondholders). ' 38
Moreover, NML has "doggedly pursued Argentina for assets abroad"
since NML I and has made attempts to repossess everything from Belgian
diplomatic accounts; to the presidential helicopter, Tango 1; to an actual
Argentinian warship, the ARA Fragata Libertad. 39 Taken as a whole,
NML I, NML II, and their ripples "turn[ed] the natural order of debt on
its head."'40 These cases did not, however, mark the last time that NML
would prevail against Argentina in a U.S. court.
B. WHERE'S MY MONEY? ARGENTINA, NML, AND POSTJUDGMENT
DISCOVERY UNDER THE FSIA
On June 16, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its most recent opin-
ion in the NML v. Argentina saga, this time dealing with post-judgment
discovery of extraterritorial assets.4' NML, in an effort to "accurately
identify the places and times when [Argentina's] assets might be subject
to attachment and execution . . . served subpoenas on two nonparty
banks, Bank of America (BOA) and Banco de la Naci6n Argentina
(BNA), an Argentinian bank with a branch in New York City."'42 Both
Argentina and BOA moved to quash NML's subpoena on BOA, and
NML subsequently moved to compel compliance. 43 NML then narrowed
its subpoenas to exclude the names of some officials during its search and
"agreed to treat as confidential any documents that the bank so
designates." 44 While "NML and BOA later negotiated additional
changes to the BOA subpoena ... BNA neither engaged in negotiation
36. Salmon, supra note 30; see generally, Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari
Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004).
37. 10 Reasons Why NML v. Argentina Matters to All, Embassy of Argentina, embas-
syofargentina.us/embassyofargentina.us/argentinamonthly/ Oreason-
swhynlmvargentinamatters.pdf, http://www.mecon.gov.ar/DESENDEUDAR/en/
doc/reports-folletol6.pdf (lasted visited Feb. 23, 2015).
38. Id.
39. Id.; Pottow, supra note 1, at 225. Argentina's war "ship was released only after a
ruling from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea." Salmon, supra note
30.
40. See Salmon, supra note 30. "It used to be that having a bond was good but that
having a judgment was much better. Now, however, it's the other way around:
judgments will get you nowhere, while bonds, if they have a pari passu clause, can
make you all-powerful." Id.
41. See generally Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
42. Id. at 2253.
43. Id. at 2253.
44. Id.
PAST DUE
nor complied with the subpoena. '4 5 The district court subsequently
granted NML's motion to compel and "reaffirmed that it would serve as a
'clearinghouse for information' in NML's efforts to find and attach Ar-
gentina's assets."'46 Of the three, Argentina was the only one to appeal
the ruling.47
Similar to its position in NML I, Argentina argued "that the court's
order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) be-
cause it permitted discovery of Argentina's extraterritorial assets" based
on the rationale that, because the statute is silent as to post-judgment
discovery, the court should interpret the statute as granting "absolute ex-
ecution immunity to foreign-state property. ' 48 The Court did not agree,
and held that FSIA does not provide sovereign debtors with immunity
from post-judgment discovery of extraterritorial assets, stating that U.S.
courts lack the authority to execute against property in foreign countries
and explaining that "even if Argentina were correct that § 1609 execution
immunity implies coextensive discovery-in-aid-of-execution immunity,
the latter would not shield from discovery of a foreign sovereign's extra-
territorial assets."' 49 Justice Scalia went on to clarify that NML's subpoe-
nas were permissible under both the FSIA and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures, because "[t]hey ask for information about Argentina's world-
wide assets generally, so that NML can identify where Argentina may be
holding property that is subject to execution. '50 When such assets do
turn up, any dispute between Argentina and NML regarding the immu-
nity of specific assets will be settled by the district court. 51
This much is clear-the Court's ruling against Argentina did nothing to
help Argentina's struggle against NML. Arguably more important than
the holding, however, is Scalia's summary snippet buried in the middle of
the opinion that states: "Thus, any sort of immunity defense made by a
foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act's text. Or
it must fall."'5 2 Said differently, under the guise of simple four corners
contract interpretation, the Court can punt issues like "the fate of inter-
national bond markets, or the sanctity of concepts such as sovereign im-
munity."' 53 The result has been pandemonium. 54 Coupled with its denial
of certiorari from NML H on the same day, the Court has put Argentina
between a rock and a hard place.5 5 "Argentina wants to pay the ex-
change bondholders, but it can't. Argentina doesn't want to pay [NML],
45. Id.
46. See id. at 2254.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2254, 2256 - 58.
49. Id. at 2557.
50. Id. at 2258.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2256.
53. Salmon, supra note 30.
54. Id.
55. See generally NML 11, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
2015]
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but it has to."'56 Faced with two unappealing alternatives, Argentina
opted for a third route and took matters into its own hands.
C. ARGENTINA'S COUNTER MEASURES AND THEIR RECEPTION
After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the FSIA did not prevent
post-judgment discovery actions against sovereign debtors and denied
certiorari for NML II, Argentina felt that it was fighting NML on uneven
ground, namely in an imperialist U.S. judiciary that favored the interests
of a small group of investors over its sovereignty.5 7 In response, Argen-
tina took action on two fronts: (1) action in the International Court of
Justice and (2) passage of domestic legislation that supersedes the U.S.
judiciary's authority to prevent payment to holders of restructured debt.58
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent NML v. Argentina
decision, Argentina filed suit "against the United States of America, re-
garding a 'Dispute concerning judicial decisions of the United States of
America relating to the restructuring of the Argentine sovereign debt."' 5 9
In its submission, Argentina alleged that the United States "committed
violations of Argentine sovereignty and immunities and other related vio-
lations as a result of judicial decisions adopted by U.S. tribunals concern-
ing the restructuring of the Argentine public debt."'60 While a strong
symbolic gesture, proceedings in the ICJ are exceedingly unlikely to bring
an end to Argentina's woes because the United States must consent to
jurisdiction for the suit to progress, something that has only occurred
twenty-two times over the past seven decades. 61
Argentina, sensing that an ICJ proceeding likely would not yield the
desired result, took direct action, and on August 19, 2014, announced
"that, in an effort to sidestep the U.S. Court ruling which blocked pay-
ments on restructured debt . . . , the government [would] submit a bill to
the Argentine Congress that lets overseas debt holders swap into new
bonds governed by Argentine law with the same terms."'62 Despite re-
ceiving admonishments from Judge Griesa in the Southern District of
56. Salmon, supra note 30.
57. Corinne Ball & Veerle Roovers, Eurosource-deals and debt-August 2014, Lrx-
OLOGY (September 3, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f6312d
fd-4c98-8ca7-c0c3ae9cff38.
58. Press Release, International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), The Argentine Republic
seeks to institute proceedings against the U.S. before the International Court of
Justice. It requests US to accept the Court's jurisdiction. (Aug. 7, 2014), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/4/18354.pdf [hereinafter I.C.J. Press Re-
lease]; Press Release, Embassy of Arg., A broad majority enacted into law the
Sovereign Payment of the Debt (Sept. 11, 2014), available at http://www.embassy-
ofargentina.us/embassyofargentina.us/en/news/140911 mecon.html [hereinafter
Arg. Embassy Press Release].
59. I.C.J. Press Release, supra note 58.
60. Id.





New York, the Argentine government continued to push the bill onto its
Senate floor.63 These efforts proved fruitful, and on September 11, 2014,
the Argentine Legislature enacted the Sovereign Payment of the Restruc-
tured Debt Law.64 This law addressed three main issues: replacing the
existing trustee (BNY Mellon, Corp.) with an Argentine trustee; granting
creditors the option to voluntarily switch the governing law of their bonds
to another jurisdiction; and validating the pari passu clause by making
"deposits for 7.6 [percent] of the bondholders that did not participate in
either of the restructuring processes carried out by Argentina in 2005 and
2010."65 The net effect of these changes is to "encourage" investors to
move their Argentine debt from the United States to Argentina or
France. "66
Although the Sovereign Payment of the Debt Law is a recent develop-
ment, Argentina put it to work immediately by depositing $161 million in
a local bank, Naci6n Fedeicomisos, to act as trustee and "make good on
an interest payment due Sept. 30."67 That effort was thwarted, at least
temporarily, when the district court foreseeably found Argentina in con-
tempt of court for making an end around effort on its ruling.68 A less
apparent effect of the court's ruling, however, could indefinitely prevent
the Sovereign Payment of the Debt Law from coming into effect. 69 Ar-
gentina's sovereign "bond contracts state that the [trustee] role must be
fulfilled by a bank that's in good standing with U.S. federal and state
law." '70 As such, it is unclear whether Naci6n Fideicomisos would be pre-
cluded from serving "as a legally valid trustee" 71 due to Argentina being
held in contempt of court. The resulting confusion has left debt holders
and banks with an unappealing decision to make: whether to be penalized
by the U.S. judiciary or by an aggressive Argentine administration. 72
63. Id.
64. Arg. Embassy Press Release, supra note 58.
65. Id.
66. Deisher, supra note 6.
67. Katia Porzecanski, How to Collect Argentina Bond Payment is Unresolved Riddle,
Bi-OOMm3RG (Oct. 2, 2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/newsl2014-10-
02/how-to-collect-argentina-bond-payment-is-unsolved-riddle.html.
68. Alison Sacriponte, US judge declares Argentina in contempt of court, JuRs'r (Sept.
30, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/09/us-judge-declares-argen-
tina-in-contempt-of-court.php.
69. See Porzecanski, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. On one hand, those that try to orchestrate payments or debt swaps could face
penalty at the hands of U.S. courts for cooperating with Argentina while it is held
in contempt. Porzecanski, supra note 67. Conversely, banks that comply with the
U.S. court's order and refuse to make payments risk Argentina revoking their
"permission to operate a local representative office." Sovereign Debt Update,
supra note 61. Argentina has gone so far as to threaten banks with "severe civil,
regulatory and criminal risks" if they do not comply with its demands. Nicole
Hong, Judge Thomas Griesa Rules Against NML Capital in Argentina Debt Case,
WALl ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-thomas-
griesa-rules-against-nml-capital-in-argentine-debt-case-1410381252 (citing Ci-
tibank, N.A.'s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
2015]
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Where this catch-22 leaves the situation going forward is anyone's
guess. 7 3 As expected though, guesses are not in short supply.
IV. COUNTDOWN TO DEBT-ONATION: POSSIBLE
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE NML
V. ARGENTINA SAGA
To be clear, there is little doubt that the outcome of NML v. Argentina
will impact the future of sovereign debt issues.74 How significant that
impact will be remains a question. As in every other aspect of this dis-
pute, the answer depends on which of two drastically divergent view-
points one subscribes to.
From NML's perspective, the outcome of the Argentine default will be
limited to just that: Argentina's default. Indeed, the American Task
Force in Argentina, an organization supported by Elliott Associates, L.P,
NML's parent company, portrays the entire conflict as a threat to nor-
malcy in the international sovereign debt market, with Argentina dis-
rupting order and casting flux into the system.75 The Second Circuit also
believes that its decisions will be of limited impact because of the pari
passu clause's "added provision that no creditor shall be subject to subor-
dination, which the court presumed is not included in other sovereign
debt contracts," and Argentina's firm stance to never pay its holdout
creditors.76 "The court's implicit suggestion [seems to be] that a debtor
who was less brazen in its refusal to meet contractual obligations and less
vocal about its general disregard for the orders of U.S. courts might not
warrant the same treatment as Argentina. '77
In contrast, Argentina asserts that its fate will "have consequences for
almost every sovereign that has issued international debt over the past
Reconsideration of the June 27, 2014 Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2014 WL 3867736 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014).
73. "It is too early to predict the long-term consequences of NML [b]ut it would be a
mistake to dismiss the case as completely sui generis." Weidemaier & Gelpern,
supra note 26, at 192.
74. "Although sovereign bond agreements drafted after Argentina's default contain
more safeguard clauses meant to protect the debtor-sovereigns, the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion will likely make restructuring more expensive, if parties attempt it at
all." Jack Jrada, Closing the Book on Argentina's Sovereign Debt Default: The
Second Circuit's Decision and its Ramifications for Sovereign Debt Restructuring in
the Eurozone, 32 RiEv. BANKING & FIN. L. 222, 231 - 23 (2013). Even if none of
the far-fetched predictions come to fruition, "[a]t the very least, the court injected
more uncertainty into the sovereign debt market by giving new meaning to the
pari passu clause, different from the interpretation that sovereign debtors held for
so many years." Id.
75. Robert J. Shapiro and Nam D. Pham, Discredited - The Impact of Argentina's Sov-
ereign Debt Default and Debt Restructuring on U.S. Taxpayers and Investors, AM.
TASK FORCE ARGENTINA, 26, http://www.atfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
atfa_- 1006.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
76. Brett M. Neve, Note and Comment, NML Capital, LTD. v. Republic of Argentina:
An Alternative to the Inadequate Remedies Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 39 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 631, 657 - 58 (2014); see also NML I, 699 F.3d
at 264 - 65.
77. Neve, supra note 76, at 658.
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[thirty] years" and NML v. Argentina might set dangerous precedent for
remedies against sovereign debtors in the future. 78 The United States has
submitted two amicus briefs in support of this position, arguing that the
Second Circuit's opinion runs contrary to U.S. interests and could under-
mine decades of work towards stability in sovereign debt restructurings.
79
Much of the international community-both sovereign nations and insti-
tutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-has aligned with
this stance as well.80
Despite both sides' rancorous contentions, however, the true implica-
tions of NML v. Argentina remain unclear. One factor that could miti-
gate negative consequences is the growing prevalence of CACs, which
"have been included in 99 [percent] of the aggregate value of New York
law bonds issued since 2005."81 This could be misleading, though, and
many commentators argue "that [CACs], when present, can only affect
restructuring where a supermajority of creditors agrees to 'take a hair-
cut.'" 8 2 Relying on creditors to act so altruistically is a hairy proposition
and many may prefer attempting "to emulate the success of Argentina's
holdouts in other courts. '8 3 If "[t]he copycat lawsuit brought by Taiwan
to collect on Grenada's defaulted debt less than sixth months after the
Second Circuit's NML ruling" is any indication, following in NML's foot-
steps instead of "taking a haircut" appears to be the more likely out-
come.8 4 Indeed, many "[p]rivate claimants also have pressed for
injunctions or similar relief against foreign sovereigns outside the debt
context."
85
Of particular importance is NML v. Argentina's effect on Greece's de-
fault in the Eurozone. The prevailing fear is that, even though "New
York law does not govern the bond agreements at issue in the Eurozone's
sovereign debt crisis, and the agreements include [CACs]," if NML suc-
ceeds in forcing Argentina to pay its holdout creditors, holders of other
sovereign debt will have a greater impetus to act similarly, which "will
seriously hamper efforts to restructure sovereign debt in the Eurozone
if... enough bondholders.., take a risk and hold out."'86 "It may be
hasty, however, to conclude that the crises in Argentina and Greece are
comparable. '8 7 While there are some similarities between the two situa-
tions, namely that both defaults came from inflexible monetary policies
tied to a currency that neither sovereign could independently control,
"the reality is that the Argentine trajectory could not have applied to
78. 10 Reasons Why NML v. Argentina Matters to All, supra note 37.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Jrada, supra note 74, at 231 (quoting NML 1, 699 F.3d at 264).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 26, at 192.
85. Id.
86. Jrada, supra note 74, at 231 - 33.
87. Chambers, supra note 24.
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Greece." 88 This is largely the result of one key difference-Argentina's
debt reformation efforts are controlled by the IMF, whereas Greece's are
led by a confluence of the European Union, the European Central Bank,
and the IMF.89 Although NML v. Argentina may affect future debt
holder expectations and strategy, it is unlikely to have the widespread
impact that many have feared. 90
The international community is also doing its part to ensure that NML
v. Argentina does not have a systemic impact on the international sover-
eign debt market. 91 In particular, the International Capital Market Asso-
ciation has proposed a plan meant to limit holdout creditors' ability to
prevent restructuring efforts, the IMF has promulgated "a series of new
proposals" meant to address collected actions problems like those faced
by Argentina, and the United Nations has passed a resolution "to begin
an 'intergovernmental negotiation process aimed at increasing the effi-
ciency, stability, and predictability of the international financial sys-
tem." 92 In addition, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed a
resolution condemning vulture funds like NML Capital. 93 These mea-
sures, however, are in the fledgling stages of their development and may
not have a direct short-term effect.94
Until international efforts prove to be effective, one recent and two
pending decisions are likely to shape the outcome of the NML v. Argen-
tina saga. To further complicate the matter, more creditors are joining
NML as holdouts every day.95 The recent decision, issued by a federal
magistrate judge in Nevada, compelled 123 nonparty corporations to
comply with NML's post-judgment efforts to discover Argentine assets. 96
Of the pending decisions, a relatively minor one that was filed in Dallas
addresses NML's efforts to compel company documents from energy
companies engaged in joint ventures with Argentina.9 7 As of February
2015, both parties were engaged in good faith negotiations regarding the
scope of the subpoenas and the motions to compel, and the company doc-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; cf Jrada, supra note 74, at 231 - 33.






95. Katia Porzecanski, Owl Creek Said to Seek Group to Accelerate Argentine Debt,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-
29/owl-creek-said-to-seek-group-to-accelerate-argentine-debt; Sheelah Kolhatkar,
A New Twist in the Argentina Debt Saga, BUSINESSWE EK (Oct. 29, 2014), http://
www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-10-28/a-surpise-appearance-in-the-argentine-
debt-drama.
96. See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 2:14-CV-492-RFB-VC, 2014
WL 3898021 at *12 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014).
97. Khadijah M. Britton, NML, Argentina Fight Over Energy Co. Subpoenas, LAw360
(Oct. 28, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/internationaltrade/articles/5907
33/nml-aregentina-fight-over-energy-co-subpoenas-.
PAST DUE
uments were stayed pending those negotiations. 98 The other decision ad-
dresses "whether or not Citigroup . . . can process an expected interest
payment by Argentina," and will have direct implications on the conflict
in U.S. courts and the Argentine legislature.99
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict between NML and Argentina presents a quandary. The
way out of the quandary and its larger implications, however, are un-
known. While fears that Argentina's fate could be transposed onto
Greece are largely misplaced, the precedent set by the result of the NML
v. Argentina saga could set the path for many future conflicts between
sovereign debtors and holdout creditors, especially with regard to the in-
terpretation of pari passu clauses. 10 0
98. Order Staying Action, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 3:12-MC-
00080, (Order Staying Action Feb. 2, 2015).
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